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Abstract 
This paper examines the optimal path of consumption over time in the context 
of population ageing. Older age groups are considered to have relatively greater 
‘needs’, resulting for example from additional health costs. These differences give rise 
to the concept of the ‘equivalent number of persons’, as distinct from the population 
size. Emphasis is given to the difference between a framework involving a 
representative agent and one in which plans are made by a social planner. The precise 
conditions under which consumption growth paths are the same under the 
representative agent and the social planner are established. This equivalence is found 
to hold only in the case where the social planner’s value judgements are such that 
individuals are considered to be the appropriate unit of analysis. An alternative 
assumption, in which equivalent persons are regarded as the appropriate units, is 
found to give rise to a different optimal consumption path. Numerical examples 
demonstrate the relative orders of magnitude for a range of parameter values. The 
differences are found to be potentially important. The choice of appropriate 
consumption units – individuals or equivalent persons – is far from arbitrary since it 
involves possibly conflicting value judgements. This choice has implications for 
policies designed to influence the optimal saving rate, such as superannuation policy 









Population Ageing and Consumption: Representative 
Agent versus Social Planner 
 
1  Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to examine the optimal path of aggregate consumption 
in the context of population ageing, where older age groups are considered to have 
relatively greater ‘needs’, resulting for example from additional health costs. These 
differences give rise to the concept of the ‘equivalent number of persons’, as distinct 
from the population size. Many models in this context employ the concept of a 
hypothetical representative agent who is assumed to be infinitely lived and who has 
the characteristics (that is, the ‘needs’) of an average person in the population in each 
year. The present paper compares the representative agent approach with an 
alternative in which the optimal aggregate consumption stream is determined by a 
social planner who is considered to maximise a social welfare, or evaluation, function 
defined over the same time horizon. The value judgements of the social planner are 
made explicit in the form of the welfare function.  
Using an individualistic and additive welfare function, total consumption per 
equivalent person contributes to social welfare in each period. In this preliminary 
investigation, individuals are considered to differ only by age and hence the planner is 
not concerned with inequality. One important issue relates to the choice of 
consumption unit in weighting the consumption per equivalent person in each period. 
Two cases are examined here – the use of individuals and of equivalent persons. Each 
of these cases has sensible, but possibly inconsistent, welfare rationales.  
The analysis is motivated by the extensive debate regarding the implications of 
population ageing, and the potential for tax smoothing to achieve an optimal time path 
of aggregate consumption. The idea that governments should smooth the tax burden 
over time was first advanced by Barro (1979), who showed that, in a deterministic 
setting, a flat path of the tax rate over time would minimize the distortions to 
behaviour arising from taxation. A key insight is that the tax rate must not distort 





rate through time in the long run (Chamley, 1986).
1 Therefore the path of the ratio of 
optimal income tax to GDP depends on the optimal path of consumption. 
Consumption smoothing implies a varying ratio of consumption to income and 
therefore a varying path of the optimal income tax to GDP ratio. In addition, because 
the optimal consumption path implies an optimal saving path, the analysis in the 
present paper has implications for policies designed to affect optimal saving such as 
superannuation policy and the fiscal balance. It is shown that these policy implications 
depend on value judgements in the evaluation of social welfare.
2 
The dominant framework for macroeconomic modelling is based on the 
behaviour of representative agents because the outcomes can be traced to 
microeconomic foundations. These agents can have either infinite lives, single period 
lives leading over time to a dynasty of individuals, or finite multi-period lives which 
imply a number of overlapping generations at a point in time. The origin of this 
framework was provided by Ramsey (1928) who assumed an infinitely lived 
individual. It is widely used in modelling economic growth and macroeconomic 
aggregates. Seminal expositions of a range of these models include, for example, 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). All large scale multi-
sector, multi-region models (computable general equilibrium models) used to model 
national and world economies are based on the behaviour of representative agents. 
Examples include the OECD’s MINILINK model, the IMF’s MULTIMOD model and 
the European Commission’s QUEST model.
3A common feature of these models is 
that the agents optimise intertemporally and this feature is the focus of attention 
below.  
                                                 
1 In the short run this rule is complicated by the optimal tax rate on the income from capital 
which is 100 percent initially, falling to zero in the long run (Chamley, 1986). 
2 These policy implications have not been acknowledged in Australian Government-
commissioned analyses of the effects of population ageing. See the Intergeneration Report, Australian 
Government (2002) and Productivity Commission (2005). 
3 For applications of these models to population ageing see, for example, Werner and Veld 
(2002) for the QUEST model, Turner et al. (1998) for the MINILINK model, and  Faruqee and 





However, the representative agent framework has been subject to a number of 
strong criticisms; see, for example, Kirman (1992). Also, it has limitations in social 
welfare analysis of public policies such as fiscal policy where it is useful to know the 
socially optimal outcome. This is because the representative agent model generates 
Pareto optimal aggregate outcomes only under strict assumptions; see, for example, 
Lewbel (1989). For this reason it is sometimes assumed that the economy is run by a 
benevolent social planner or decision maker.  
This paper contributes to the literature by identifying a source of difference 
between the representative agent and social planner paradigms in the particular 
context of population ageing. The difference turns out to depend on whether the social 
planner is concerned with individuals or equivalent persons in evaluating social 
welfare. 
The basic framework of analysis, involving a difference between the number 
of people and the equivalent population size, is described in section 2. The optimal 
consumption path of a representative agent is examined in section 3. Section 4 turns to 
the optimal path determined by a social planner, where particular attention is given to 
the choice of the unit of analysis. Some comparisons are made in section 5, followed 
by numerical examples in section 6. Brief conclusions are in section 7.  
2  The Basic Framework 
This section outlines the basic framework of analysis, involving population 
growth arising from differential growth rates across age groups. The number of 
individuals aged i in year t is denoted  i, t N , so the total population in year t is 
, ti t
i
NN =∑ . Individuals of different ages are assumed to have different ‘basic needs’, 
reflected in an equivalence size,  i s . This is similar in some ways to the type of adult 
equivalence scale used in the measurement of poverty and inequality. A higher value 
of si implies a lower capacity to derive utility from a given dollar amount of 
consumption. The scale is normalised such that it is unity at age 
* i , so that  1 * i s = . 
The population size can therefore be adjusted to ‘equivalent person’ units. The 
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Over time, the population age structure is assumed to change in an exogenous 
manner, resulting in population growth at the proportional rate,  t n , where: 
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and is a weighted sum of the proportional change in each age group. Similarly, the 
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and the difference between the growth rates is a weighted average over all age groups 
of the growth in each age group, with weights depending on the proportional 
difference between the equivalence scale for that age and the average equivalence size 
of the population.  
Suppose the only changes taking place over time are the exogenous population 
changes affecting total population and its age composition, and average income 
changes which result from labour productivity growth at the fixed rate, g. Individuals 
alive at any time have been assumed to differ only in their ages; members of the same 
cohort have common income and consumption levels. The question considered here 





population changes. Clearly, this must depend crucially on the way in which the 
objective function is specified. 
3  The Representative Agent 
Over time, the average age of the population, and hence its average 
‘equivalent size’, changes. Consider a ‘representative agent’, who in each period is 
regarded as having the average age of the population and hence an equivalent size 
equal to the average equivalent size of the population. This artificial representative 
person is assumed to maximise a utility function, specified over an infinite horizon, 
which has as arguments the level of consumption in each period,  t c , expressed as a 
ratio of (average) equivalent size in each period.
4 The representative agent’s 
optimisation problem is to select the time path of consumption,  t c .  
While individuals have finite lifetimes, the representative agent has the age 
and thus needs of an average person in each period and is assumed to maximise a 


















= ⎢⎥ − ⎣⎦ ∑  (6) 
where θ is the pure time preference rate and β is the representative agent’s elasticity 
of marginal utility of consumption.
5 This is maximised subject to the intertemporal 
budget constraint, assuming no initial assets, given by: 
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4 The term  t c  is therefore not an average, but the consumption of the representative agent 
who has the average needs of the population. This differs from an alternative approach, which may be 
to define  i, t c  as the consumption of each person aged i at time t, where all individuals of the same age 






N ∑ . The representative 
agent does not, in the approach adopted in the text above, attempt to maximize utility defined in terms 
of the ratio of average consumption to average equivalent population size.  
5 The parameter β  may be said to reflect the representative agent’s (relative) aversion to 





where r is the constant interest rate.  
The marginal rate of substitution between consumption in periods t and t+1, 
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Finally, assuming constant labour productivity growth, g, the growth rate of 
consumption per equivalent persons, deflated by productivity, is given by: 
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since  / sP N =  and  / ss p n =−  . 
4  The Social Planner. 
This section considers the optimal consumption path determined by a social 
planner whose aim is to maximise an additive social welfare function defined over an 
infinite horizon. As it has been assumed that individuals alive at any time differ only 
in their ages, the social planner has no concern for within-period inequalities. Section 
4.1 discusses the basic form of the welfare function, and examines the precise 
conditions under which welfare can be regarded as a function of the ratio of aggregate 
consumption to aggregate equivalent population size in each period. The question 
then remains of the choice of how to weight this term. This involves the choice of 
appropriate unit of analysis – that is, whether the unit should be the individual or the 
equivalent person. This issue has been examined in the context of inequality and 





conflicting value judgements. These issues are discussed in subsection 4.2. 
Subsections 4.3 and 4.4 examine in turn the implications of using the two units. 
4.1  The Social Welfare Function 
Suppose that the planner is concerned with per capita consumption per 
equivalent person in each period. The term entering the welfare function in each 
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This may be compared with the ratio of average consumption,  t c , to the 
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In general the ratio of averages and the average of ratios are not equal. 
Appendix A examines this issue in detail, where it is shown that there are essentially 
two situations under which the social welfare function may be regarded simply as 
containing the term  / tt CP  for each period. The first is the case where, if individuals 
are considered to attempt to perfectly smooth needs-weighted consumption,  ,, / it it cs , 
such that this term is constant except for some purely random variation over the 
(finite) lifetime, it may be supposed that  ,, / it it cs  is the same for all ages, i(except for 
a random error term). While the difference in the needs of individuals over the life 
cycle means that the  , it c  vary with i, the consumption per equivalent person may be 





welfare function can be expressed in terms of  / tt CP  for each period.
6 The second 
context is where  , it s  and  , it c  are uncorrelated, in which case Appendix A shows that 
the two terms – the ratio of average consumption to average equivalent size and the 
average of the consumption per equivalent person – are proportional, with the 
constant of proportionality remaining constant over time. Again, the social welfare 
function can be expressed in terms of  / tt CP  for each period.  
4.2  Alternative Consumption Units 
As discussed in the previous subsection, the social welfare function is regarded as a 
function of consumption per equivalent person in each period. One approach is to 
treat the individual as the basic unit of analysis, so that the consumption per 
equivalent person is regarded as being assigned to each of the  t N  individuals in the 
population. The value judgement inherent in this approach is that every person ‘counts 
for one’ irrespective of the demographic structure of the time period. This approach 
consequently has the property of anonymity.
7 
However, the use of the individual as the unit of analysis can give rise to a 
result that may at first seem paradoxical. The equivalence scale implies that a 
population consisting of a larger proportion of younger individuals is regarded as 
being ‘more efficient’ at generating welfare. Hence, a transfer of consumption from a 
period of low consumption (with many older people having high basic needs) to a 
richer period (with relatively few older people) may actually raise social welfare.
8  
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7 In the context of inequality and welfare measurement, this value judgement was called the 
‘compensation principle’ by Shorrocks (2004) and the ‘Pareto indifference principle’ by Decoster and 
Ooghe (2003). 
8 Hence the use of individuals does not necessarily satisfy the ‘principle of transfers’, as 





An alternative approach to defining a unit of analysis is to use the ‘adult 
equivalent person’.
9 This approach assigns to each of the  t P  equivalent persons the 
consumption per equivalent person. It means that the measurement of consumption 
and the unit of analysis are treated consistently. Individuals no longer ‘count as one’ 
but have a weight depending on the demographic structure of the population to which 
they belong. An important feature of this approach is that it cannot give rise to the 
paradoxical situation described above. 
Consequently, the choice between individuals and adult equivalents as the basic unit 
of analysis involves a choice between two incompatible value judgements. They can 
in principle lead to different conclusions about the effects of transferring consumption 
between time periods, which has implications for the path of optimal saving and the 
optimal income tax burden.  
4.3  Individuals as Units of Analysis 
Suppose that the social planner takes the individual as the basic unit of 
analysis. This implies that  t N  is used as the weight attached to each period’s 
contribution of consumption per equivalent person to social welfare function. If it is 
further assumed that the welfare function involves a similar iso-elastic form to that of 



















= ⎢⎥ − ⎣⎦ ∑  (15) 
Here the parameters   and  β θ  refer to the value judgements of the social 
planner, rather than the utility function of a hypothetical representative individual.
10 
This social welfare, or evaluation, function is maximised subject to the following 
resource constraint for the economy, again assuming no initial assets: 
                                                 
9 In the context of distributional analyses, this was proposed by Ebert (1997). 
10 The values of β  and θ  are influenced purely by the value judgements of the social 
planner and therefore cannot be objectively measured. However, attempts to evaluate people’s value 
judgements, or to estimate the values implicit in policy decisions, can be of interest: on these issues, see 
Creedy (2006). Some writers have clearly expressed their values regarding the choice of θ , believing 
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where  t Y  is aggregate income in period t.  
The marginal rate of substitution between aggregate consumption in two 
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Using  tt t Cc N =  this condition can be written in terms of changes in average 
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Taking logarithms and allowing for productivity growth gives: 
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 (20) 
This equation is the same as the result regarding the representative agent, 
except that the former is expressed in terms of the consumption in each period of a 
hypothetical infinitely-lived individual who in each period has needs determined by 
the average equivalent size of individuals. The optimal consumption path is the same 
for both cases – where the social planner’s value judgements regarding β  and θ  are 
the same as the assumed preferences of the representative agent.  
In the above approach, the social welfare function has been expressed in terms 
of consumption (per equivalent person) in each period, where the social planner is 
assumed to be averse to variability over time. This aversion is reflected in the 
parameter β , which applies in addition to the pure time preference of the planner, 
measured by θ . An alternative approach might express the social welfare function in 
terms of total utility in each period, given an additional assumption that all individuals 





elastic utility function, with parameter  0 β , and the planner’s aversion to variability is 
given by  1 β . The above social welfare function then becomes: 
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However, it is found that the Euler equation governing the growth of average 
consumption is the same as that given above in equation (20), where β  is replaced 
using: 
  ( ) 10 1 1 β ββ β =+ −  (22) 
Hence comparisons can be made simply by reinterpreting the parameter β . 
4.4  Equivalent Persons as Units. 
Assume that the social planner regards equivalent persons, rather than 
individuals, as the appropriate unit of analysis. The weight in each period is thus Pt, 
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Converting to average consumption and allowing for productivity growth gives: 
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This Euler equation differs from that in the previous case where the individual is 
regarded as the appropriate unit of analysis. The difference between the two growth 
















Hence the relative growth rates of consumption depend on the growth rate of the 
population compared with its equivalent size. For example, if population ageing 





regarded as the unit, compared with the case where the equivalent person is the unit. 
This means that relatively more consumption is moved into earlier periods, when the 
population is younger and more efficient at converting consumption into welfare. 
Each individual ‘counts as one’, so more weight is given to these periods than when 
the unit is the number of equivalent persons.   
5  Some Comparisons 
The previous sections have derived alternative Euler equations governing the 
optimal consumption path of the economy. The form of the Euler equation for an 
infinitely lived representative agent, having in each period the average equivalent size 
of the population, was found to be the same as that for a social planner who regards 
the individual as the unit of analysis, or weight, in the social welfare function.
11 
However, if the equivalent person is regarded as the appropriate unit of analysis, the 
social planner’s optimal consumption path differs from the other two cases. As 
discussed above, the choice of these consumption units, or population aggregates, is a 
normative issue, involving possibly conflicting value judgements. 
The Euler equations differ in the way that the term (p-n) affects the optimal 
consumption path. The term (p-n) reflects the changing consumption demands, and 
therefore capacity for generating utility, implied by an ageing population. As the 
population ages, P rises relative to N and therefore (p-n)>0, reflecting increasing 
consumption demands and declining capacity to generate utility. 
To the representative agent and the social planner using the individual as the 
unit of analysis, (p-n)>0 implies an additional subjective discounting factor. If a dollar 
of consumption is postponed one period it will reduce welfare because the demands 
on a dollar of consumption are higher. This creates a desire to shift consumption 
towards the present. On the other hand there is an offsetting desire to shift 
consumption towards the future which arises from the desire to smooth C/P. The 
desire to smooth consumption is stronger the larger is the value of β. These two 
                                                 
11 The only difference is that the representative agent Euler equation is in terms of the 






opposite forces on intertemporal consumption are reflected in the term (β-1)(p-n) in 
the Euler equation. Hence the net rate of subjective discounting is θ-(β-1)(p-n), which 
is compared with the interest rate, r, to determine whether consumption is tilted 
toward the future or the present. 
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where  1/ φ β =  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This equation implies 
that the increasing average consumption demands implied by an ageing population 
tilts consumption towards the present if  1 φ > , towards the future if  1 φ < , and neither 
way if  1 φ = . 
For the social planner adopting equivalent persons as units, the term (p-n) 
implies no additional discounting motive because in deriving social welfare the 
planner is summing over P rather than over N. In other words, the growth of P relative 
to N has no relevance for the evaluation of social welfare. It has relevance only in 
determining the optimal growth of per capita consumption. 
6  Numerical Examples 
This section considers whether the difference between the two approaches – 
using individuals or equivalent persons as units – is important. Numerical examples 
are given, and sensitivity analyses are reported for alternative values of β and 
projections of p-n using Australian data for the period 2004-2050. Subsection 6.1 
examines population growth and the associated changes in the equivalent population 
size, using a flexible specification for the variation in  i s  with age. The sensitivity of 
the optimal consumption stream to variations in the parameters describing the value 





6.1  Population Projections 
The population projections are taken from the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(Catalogue 3222.0) series for total persons (as no distinction is made in the model 
between males and females). These data provide the series for N and therefore n.  
In calibrating the age-specific consumption weights, si, which are used to 
calculate the series for P and hence p, it is desirable to specify these in terms of a 
parametric function relating the scales to age. This allows for sensitivity analyses to 
be carried out. The following semi-logarithmic functional form: 
  ()
1
log i sa i
b
=+  (28) 
is sufficiently flexible and allows the scale to increase systematically with age.  
Initial, or ‘baseline’, parameter values were estimated using values of  i s which 
were calculated as a weighted average of private and social consumption weights.
12 
The private weights were calculated from Household Expenditure Survey data for 
2003-4 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6530.0, Table 19). Expenditure per 
equivalent adult was calculated by dividing household expenditure for each age 
category by the number of equivalent adults in the household. The latter were 
calculated using the parametric equivalence scales suggested by Cutler and Katz 
(1992) and used by, for example, Banks and Johnson (1994), Jenkins and Cowell 
(1994). This takes the form: 
  () ac mN N
α
θ =+  (29) 
where m is the number of equivalent adults in the household, Na and Nc are the 
number of adults and children respectively. The parameter θ is a weight between zero 
and 1 reflecting the lower consumption needs of children, and α is a parameter 
reflecting economies of scale in household budgets. The following examples use 
values of θ and α of 0.5 and 0.75 respectively; these are in the middle of the range 
                                                 
12 In the context of the social planner, these weights may perhaps be regarded as being 
determined by value judgements concerning, for example, the allocation of health resources to the 
aged. The sensitivity analyses reported below may thus be regarded as reflecting differing value 





reported by Creedy and Sleeman (2005), estimated using a wide range of scales 
suggested in the literature.  
The social expenditure weights were calculated using data on age-specific 
health, education and aged care consumption for 2004 used in Productivity 
Commission (2005)
13. Both the private and social consumption weights are assumed 
here to be constant over the projection period. The total consumption weights, si, were 
calculated by adding the private and social consumption weights, which are 
themselves weighted by the shares of private and social consumption in total 
consumption. The baseline values of a and b respectively were found to be 0.5 and 
4.0. Figure 1 shows the profiles obtained using several parameter combinations.  
 




















































                                                 




































The corresponding series for p-n are plotted in Figure 2. The difference in 
these growth rates tends to decline over time because the changes in the population 
age shares diminish over time. For example, in the initial years from 2005 there is a 
relatively large shift in the population from young to old age groups which tends to 
produce a large gap between p and n. As the age distribution stabilises the gap 
between p and n diminishes. 
6.2  Optimal Consumption Paths 
Simulating the path of optimal consumption growth, cc  , requires, in addition 
to the population series for n and p, values of the parameters r, β, θ and g. In all the 
following computations, the values of r and g are fixed at 4 per cent and 1.75 per cent. 
The Productivity Commission (2005) adopts a base case value of 1.75 per cent for g, 
and 4 per cent is a typical value for the real interest rate long run macroeconomic 
models.  
Three values of β are examined: 0.5, 1.5 and 2.5, which covers a wide range of 
plausible values for this parameter. It is useful to consider the precise nature of the 
















− ∑ , he recognised the difficulty of forming 
views about the orders of magnitude of ε. In order to help interpretation, he used the 
idea of a ‘leaky bucket’ experiment, which considers the extent to which a judge is 
prepared to tolerate some loss in making a transfer from one person to another. 
Consider two individuals, so that from the welfare function, setting the total 











The welfare function is thus homothetic, as the slopes of social indifference curves are 
the same along any ray drawn through the origin. Consider two individuals and, using 
discrete changes, suppose a dollar is taken from the richest, such that  2 1 y ∆= − . The 













For example, if  21 2 yy =  and ε=1.5, it is necessary to give person 1 only 35 
cents - a leak of 65 cents from the original dollar taken from person 2 is tolerated. If 
ε=1, a leak of 50 cents is tolerated. In the present intertemporal context (with an 
unchanged population), suppose that total consumption in the first period is 100 and 
this grows at a rate of 0.02 per period. In period 10 it is thus 119.5, and a judge with 
2 β =  would be prepared to take a dollar from period 10, and give only $0.70 to 
period 1. By period 20 total income would be 145.7, and the same judge would reduce 
period 20's income by $1 while adding only $0.47 to the first period. 
The discount rate, ρ , is given by the Ramsey equation,  g ρ θβ = + . In the 
following calculations, values of θ are given by the condition that  0 cc=   in a steady 
state. This condition is required in non-overlapping generations models, given a 
constant interest rate, in order to rule out inadmissible paths – in particular paths in 
which consumption goes to zero or infinity.
14 This implies that the discount rate is 
                                                 
14 In overlapping generations models this condition on θ is not required, because the cross-





equal to r, so that  rg θ β =− . Hence θ  is not set independently and is determined by 
the value of β  adopted. The resulting series for cc  are given in Figures 3 and 4. 
Figure 3 applies to the case of the representative agent or the social planner using 
individuals as the unit of analysis. Figure 4 applies to the case of the social planner 
using equivalent persons as the unit of analysis. 
 
 
Figure 3 Optimal Consumption Growth for Social Planner:  



































The magnitudes of the differences between the paths in Figures 3 and 4 are 
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, which is the 
difference in optimal consumption growth, for the various alternative combinations of 
parameters. Different growth rates imply different paths of consumption in levels. The 
paths of consumption in levels can be compared by solving for the initial value of 
consumption for the case where equivalent persons are used, 





same value of aggregate discounted consumption as in the case where the number of 
person is used, 
N cc  . This is shown in Figure 6, where c
N and c
P refer to levels of 
consumption where individuals and equivalent persons, respectively, are the unit of 
analysis. The largest difference occurs for β=0.5. In that case optimal consumption 
would be 4 percent higher in 2005 and 4 percent lower in 2050 if individuals are the 
unit of analysis rather than equivalent persons, for a given value of aggregate 
discounted consumption over the 46 year period. This is not trivial, nor arguably are 
the values around 1 and 2 percent for the other simulations. 
 
 
Figure 4  Optimal Consumption Growth For Social Planner:  




















































































Optimal consumption levels imply optimal saving levels which inform policy 
decisions such as the appropriate fiscal balance and superannuation policy. If optimal 
consumption is higher for one social welfare function than another, then optimal 
saving is lower. In general, if  ( ) 1
N P cx c =+  and assuming income, y, is the same for 
both consumption paths
15, then  1










0.01 x = , a mid-range value in Figure 6,  then  0.192
N s
y
== . That is a difference of 




                                                 
15 It differs slightly because different consumption paths imply different saving paths and 





Figure 6  Percentage Difference in Consumption Levels  


































7  Conclusions 
This paper has examined the optimal path of consumption over time in the 
context of population ageing. Emphasis was given to the difference between a 
framework involving a representative agent and one in which plans are made by a 
social planner. The precise conditions under which consumption growth paths are the 
same under the representative agent and the social planner were established. This 
equivalence was found to hold only in the case where the social planner’s value 
judgements are such that individuals are considered to be the appropriate unit of 
analysis. An alternative assumption, in which equivalent persons are regarded as the 
appropriate units, was found to give rise to a different optimal consumption path. 
Numerical examples demonstrated the relative orders of magnitude for a range of 
parameter values. The differences were found to be potentially important. The choice 
of appropriate consumption units – individuals or equivalent persons – is far from 





These value judgements, by influencing the optimal path of consumption in 
response to population ageing, have implications for policies designed to influence the 
optimal saving rate, such as superannuation policy and the fiscal balance. The 
numerical illustrations reported in this paper suggest that the choice of social welfare 
function could imply a difference in optimal saving at a given time in the order of 1 
percent of GDP, which is arguably not trivial. In addition, the optimal consumption 
path has implications for the optimal path of income taxes, on the principal that 






Appendix A.  Consumption per Adult Equivalent 
Person 
This appendix examines the social welfare function expressed in terms of 
average consumption per equivalent person, and the relationship between a welfare 
function in terms of the ratio of average consumption to the average equivalent size. 
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The last term in this expression is a weighted average of c/s, with weights 
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⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ∂ ⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
∑  
This approach is too cumbersome, and it is therefore necessary to consider the 
relationship between  () / E cs and  ( ) ( ) / E cE s  in more detail. For this purpose it is 
more convenient to work in terms of distributions. 
Suppose  , it c  and  , it s are jointly lognormally distributed with means and 
variances of logarithms denoted by 
2 and  µ σ , with appropriate subscripts, and with a 
correlation of ρ . Then, dropping the t subscripts, and using the lognormal property 
that in general  () ()
2 exp 0.5
x x Ex µ σ =+ : 
()
() () {}
22 exp 0.5 cs c s
Ec
Es
µµ σσ =− +−  






22 ,2 cs c s c s µ µσ σ ρ σ σ Λ− + −  
Hence: 
() {}
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=  where γ  is the regression coefficient in a linear 
regression of the log of c on the log ofs, the condition applies only if the regression 
coefficient is unity. This condition is in fact equivalent, except for the addition of a 
random error term, to the assumption that the ratio  / cs  is the same for all age groups, 
since there is a unit elasticity of c with respect to s. This assumption is clearly very 
strong.  
However, there is an alternative case, under which the two terms (the ratio of 
averages and the average of ratios) are not equal, but if the two variables are 
independent, so that  0 ρ = , the ratio of averages is a proportion of the average of 
ratios, with the constant of proportionality being equal to  ( )
2 exp s σ − . It is not 
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